Kremlinul are nevoie de o Moldova unita si puternica, cu un statut de neutralitate recunoscut de catre comunitatea internationala


Izvestia in Moldova publica un comentariu care are ca tema problema transnistreana si integrarea teritoriala a R. Moldova.
Citim ca, desi pare ciudat, dar, dupa sapte ani de tacere, in contextul intalnirii presedintelui RM Vladimir Voronin cu seful administratiei din Transistria Igor Smornov, a aparut o intrebare clasica: ce e de facut mai departe? S-ar parea ca, la prima vedere, „totul e clar”, intrucat participantii la dialog „s-au inteles sa consolideze increderea reciproca a locuitorilor celor doua maluri ale Nistrului”.
Reiesind din aceasta situatie, Izvestia in Moldova scrie ca totusi problema transnistreana ramane pana acum a fi nesolutionata, iar „conflictul „inghetat” de aproape 18 ani ramane, din pacate, fara schimbari”.
Dupa atatea esecuri diplomatice de a pune punct diferendului transnistrean, situatia a inceput sa se schimbe astazi: „Dupa proclamarea independentei Kosovo, precum si a extinderii granitelor de est ale NATO, Rusia, desi cu intarziere, totusi a atras atentia in cel mai serios mod asupra vectorului sud-estic”.
Referindu-se la starea de conflict din R. Moldova, Izvestia in Moldova scrie: „Moscovei nu-i convine starea de „conflict” din republica. Kremlinul are nevoie de o Moldova unita si puternica, precum si cu un statut de neutralitate recunoscut de catre comunitatea internationala. Intr-un cuvant, Rusia ar dori sa aiba Moldova in calitate partener strategic de nadejde, iata de ce trebuie sa ne asteptam ca diplomatia rusa sa depuna toate eforturile ca sa rezolve definitiv conflictul transnistrean, astfel demonstrandu-se lumii cum trebuie de rezolvat un conflict”.
In concluzie, Izvestia in Moldova scrie ca acum „este prematur a se vorbi despre un oarecare statut pe care l-ar avea Moldova si Transnistria”: „… acum este important ca cele doua maluri sa ajunga a se intelege cu incredere, sa se inteleaga referitor la anularea barierelor economice, vamale si de alta natura dintre cele doua maluri ale Nistrului, sa li se permita oamenilor a calatori liber, iar mai apoi Chisinaul si Tiraspolul sa pregateasca documentul politic”.


  1. Moldova Unita

    Moldovans want shelter from the Russians under NATO’s umbrella, and they want to enjoy lifestyles that only EU accession can give them.
    But before they meet conditions for accession, the Russians may have a greatly enhanced capacity to interfere. The best chance for the citizens of the Republic of Moldova is Re-unification with the Romanian province of Moldova.
    Recent events indicate that the Russians are not prepared to concede their domination of the Black Sea to NATO, and that they are preparing to Ossetianise the Crimea. Their success in the 2008 war with Georgia must only give them confidence.
    For example, they have been issuing Russian passports to anyone in Crimea who wants one, and the war with Georgia demonstrated their willingness to implement their declared policy of military intervention abroad to protect Russian citizens.
    Crimea is more Russian than either Abkhazia or South Ossetia, the Georgian regions now occupied by Russia. It was only transferred from the Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954, during the power struggle following the death of Stalin. There are more than twice as many ethnic Russians than Ukrainians in Crimea, and more than three quarters of Crimeans speak Russian as their native language, compared to only 10% for Ukrainian.
    The Russians have threatened to move their Black Sea Fleet to Sukhumi in Abkhazia if the Ukrainians don’t renew the lease on Sevastopol in the Crimea in 2017. They can now use the inevitable world objection to this as an excuse to stay in Sevastopol.
    Sevastopol is an official Hero City of the Soviet Union. Known as a „City of Russian Glory”, it has enormous historical and symbolic meaning for the Russians
    The Russians are now demonstrating a greater willingness to project their force than at any time since the end of the Cold War, even as far as Venezuela.
    When Russia mobilised part of the Black Sea Fleet towards Abkhazia during the 2008 war with Georgia, Ukraine’s President Viktor Yushchenko announced that the Black Sea Fleet would henceforth need permission to cross the Ukrainian border and go to Sevastopol. The Russians short response was that the President of The Russian Federation commands the Fleet, not Ukraine.
    I was in the Kuban in Southern Russia last year, and I saw (from a distance) a new port the Russians are building on the Taman Peninsula in sight of Crimea across the Kerch Strait, ostensibly to service bulk wine imports. (They need to import much more bulk wine since their orchestrated successful campaign to replace wine imports from Moldova and Georgia with ‘Russian’ wine from the Kuban, which is mostly made from imported bulk wine.)
    I thought at the time it was a strange place to build such a port, given that their imports come mostly from Argentina, Spain and Sicily, on ships with draughts too large for the Kerch Strait, and they already have more suitable ports on the Black Sea coast. However, the port would be ideal to support action in Crimea.
    Putin’s declared regret at the demise of the USSR also suggests that Moldova could be a target for Russian expansion back to the borders that the Russian Empire had for hundreds of years.
    If the Russians do Ossetianise Crimea, they would then have a stronger motive to use Transnistria, the breakaway Moldovan region north of the Dniester River, which continues to be a base for the Russian military, as a beachhead in Moldova. With the Russian client-state Belarus, they would then almost encircle Ukraine.
    Their use of the Ossetian crisis as an opportunity to also move into Abkhazia indicates that their policy is: “If we must bear opprobrium for one advance, why not two?”
    So, the Moldovans can’t wait until they qualify for the EU. Their best chance is union with Romania. But Moldovan politicians are more interested in keeping their jobs, and Moldovans aren’t as close to Bucharest as they were in 1991. The Romanians are less keen on union now too, since they can now look down on the poorer Moldovans with their funny dialect, whereas in Soviet times it was the reverse.
    But the present-day Republic of Moldova, formerly known as Bessarabia, is just the half of Moldova which went to the USSR following a pact between Hitler and Stalin. The Romanian Moldovans receive the same treatment by Bucharestians for their accents, and many identify more with historical Moldova than with the much more recent amalgamation that is Romania.
    When the question is not absorption by Romania, but re-unification of Moldova, people both in the Republic of Moldova and in the Romanian province of Moldova are much more enthusiastic.
    The most common objection to re-unification from Moldovans north of the Prut is that they would lose Transnistria. But Transnistria was never really part of Bessarabia, or Moldova, anyway, and there is no way the Russians will give it up.
    Re-unification of the ancient Moldova of Stefan cel Mare is the Moldovans’ best chance.